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Poverty in New Orleans: Before and After Katrina
B
GLORIA SIM0, PH.D.

Assistant Director, Chaddick Institute of Metropolitan Development,
DePaul University

On 29 August 2005, Hurricane Katrina inflicted massive damage on the
states of Louisiana, Alabama, and Mississippi. While the physical damage in
all these areas was indescribable, the effects were exacerbated in the city of
New Orleans as the levee system was breached at multiple locations, causing caused massive flooding in many neighborhoods, from the poorer black
neighborhoods in Mid-City and the Lower Ninth Ward to the middle-class
white neighborhood of Lakeview, forcing many residents of these communities from their homes. On 30 August, the United States of America awoke to
media coverage of the increasing damage in New Orleans on national television, with floodwaters covering the city and American citizens stranded on
the rooftops of their homes and inside the Superdome.
These dire circumstances continued to deteriorate as local, state, and
federal agencies left many residents to fend for themselves. The faces depicted in national media coverage looked increasingly desperate each day while
news coverage continued into the following weekend. As that weekend wore
on, viewers from around the world could not believe what they were seeing:
that these horrendous conditions could exist in the United States. It also became increasingly clear that a disproportionate number of people victimized
by Katrina had been extremely disadvantaged even before the storm, and
had lost what little they possessed to the raging floodwaters. Questions then
arose as to why government response to the storm was so slow and insufficient. Critics began to speculate that government officials were hoping to
change the demographic characteristics of pre-Katrina New Orleans by giving the poor and disenfranchised no other alternative but to leave the only
homes they had ever known and move to another region of the state or coun
try, thus dispersing the poverty and misery to someplace - anyplace - else.
In fact, that is what occurred in many neighborhoods.
According to a June 2006 Brookings report, the largest population losses
in hurricane-impacted areas of the Gulf Coast were in the New Orleans metro area and in Orleans parish, which incorporates most of the city. According
to this report, the current population of this area is more white, less poor,
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and more transitory than the pre-hurricane population. This is in contrast
to counties along the Mississippi coast, which lost more of their white residents and homeowners after the hurricane. Other Gulf Coast metropolitan
communities in Louisiana, such as Baton Rouge, took in these fleeing residents but experienced only minor shifts in their demographic characteristics,
which suggests that the impact from New Orleans evacuees was minimal,
and also that the poor and minority populations that fled from the city really
did move to other regions of the country.

The Rebuild Center, built on the grounds of St. Joseph Church.
Photo courtesy of the author

But many residents were simply unable to leave. While some reporters
claimed that those stranded in New Orleans had not even attempted to leave,
others acknowledged that many residents had no choice as they could not afford to escape or were not provided the necessary assistance to do so. Although
it was the worst crisis of its kind in the U.S., Katrina was not the first weather
emergency in which poverty had a severe impact on the residents' ability to
prepare for the situation, cope with it, and recover from it in the long term.
In 2005 the South Florida Sun-Sentinel conducted an investigation of the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and found that repeated cuts
in federal funding for the National Hurricane Center had greatly hampered its
capacity to predict the path and severity of hurricanes. The Sun-Sentinel also
found that when hurricanes are predicted, or do hit, it is the tone of the government which helps or hinders an adequate response, and most of this response
- or lack thereof - is shown to have the worst effects on the poor.
For example, Governor Jeb Bush of Florida encouraged citizens to "take
personal responsibility" in preparing for the hurricane season of 2005, just
prior to Katrina. Preparedness was defined as stocking up on all the equipment, food, water, and medicine necessary to ride out the storms, or making
sure they had enough gas in their cars to evacuate if need be. But, the question
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became: What does this mean to the poor, disabled, and elderly whose food
stamps or Social Security were spent earlier in the month, who also need medication that their Medicare and Medicaid will not allow them to stock up on,
and who do not have cars to fill up with gas - even if they had the money
for gas - but would instead need to take public transportation, which might
not even be available? These are the people, the poor and near-poor, who live
clustered in areas most vulnerable to severe weather conditions.
These same factors also played a role in evacuation when Hurricane
Katrina hit New Orleans. Jane Daugherty, a four-time winner of the Robert F.
Kennedy Journalism Award for her coverage of the disadvantaged, discusses
the faces of poverty in New Orleans after Katrina! She confirms that the
poor had no choice but to stay put as they could not afford to leave, mainly
because they could not afford the necessary supplies. She also points out that
poverty is not the only issue, and that other demographics contributed to the
problem. Daugherty characterizes two specific groups most gravely affected
in the aftermath of Katrina in New Orleans: the "elderly person, who lives
alone and spends almost every dollar of their Social Security check on housing, prescriptions and food," and the "single mother with a couple of preschool children who takes the bus to work, gets food stamps to help feed her
kids, and whose medical care is paid by Medicaid (if she qualifies) because
her job at Wal-Mart or McDonald's doesn't include health care benefits.112
Another author also points out that the majority of poor residents who were
trapped in the Superdome for days without food and water were AfricanAmerican, and claims that this was why it took so long for the news media to
report on the deplorable conditions and the extreme need for help.3
So it was not just poverty itself (as defined only by income levels) but
also many of the factors often associated with poverty that either kept the citizens of New Orleans from evacuating or made them more anxious to return
to their homes and what was left of their belongings. Some of these factors
- such as race, gender, and age - are commonly understood as leading to
poverty in the U.S., while others - such as health, housing, education, jobs,
and income - are the outcomes of poverty. This article focuses on how all

of these problems need to be addressed in the spirit of Saint Vincent de Paul,
not only to make progress in New Orleans, but also to show how these issues
1

Jane Daugherty, "Remembering Those Who Are Usually Forgotten," in What Katrina
Revealed, Nieman Reports (Spring 2006), at http:! !www.nieman.harvard.edu!reports!06-1NRspring! p06-0601-daugherty.html.
2

Daugherty, "Remembering."
Claudia Meléndez Salinas, "When the Role Race Plays in Societal Gaps is Unspoken," in

What Katrina Revealed, Nieman Reports (Spring 2006), at http:! !www.nieman.harvard.edu!

reports/ 06-lNRspring!NR06-01_Katrina_eMprint.pdf.
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can be addressed in other impoverished communities and have a long-term
impact on poverty conditions.
This article applies these principles to a particular neighborhood in New
Orleans known as Tulane! Canal in the larger Mid-City community and reflects
on the work of faculty, staff, and students from the School of Public Service
(SPS) and the Chaddick Institute for Metropolitan Development at DePaul
University, and its effects on poverty conditions that existed in that neighborhood after Katrina. The article also examines the demographic landscape of
New Orleans in relation to relevant literature on the politics of poverty, race,
and gender, discusses how we define poverty in the U.S., and examines the
other factors of poverty which apply in this context. Finally it examines the
role that faculty and students of SPS and Chaddick played in serving these
poor residents of New Orleans, fulfilling their Vincentian mission.
The Case: Tulane/Canal and Mid-City
The conditions outlined above were especially evident in the Tulane! Canal
neighborhood located less than half a mile away from the Superdome, and just
outside the historic French Quarter and the central business district, where
post-Katrina flood waters ranged from three to more than seven feet deep. This
neighborhood also houses the regional medical center, including several major
hospitals, but it was also marked by widely recognized characteristics of poverty pre-Katrina. These indicators included the Iberville public housing project
and a population that was 50.8 percent African-American, with a median annual household income of $6,875 and an individual poverty rate of 54 percent at
the time of the 2000 U.S. census, five years prior to Katrina. Forces were at work
even then to improve the plight of these poverty-stricken residents, but when
they were finally allowed to return to their homes after Katrina they found that
they needed even more assistance: many of their homes were badly damaged or
totally destroyed, medical facilities were closed down, and government agencies and private developers were seeking to change the demographics of their
neighborhood so that they could no longer afford to live there.
A focal point of hope for this neighborhood's poor residents, both before and after the storm, has been Saint Joseph Roman Catholic Church located in the heart of Mid-City. Reverend Perry Henry, C.M., pastor of St.
Joseph, and Sister Vera Butler, P.B.V.M., Executive Director of the Tulane!
Canal Neighborhood Development Corporation (T/CNDC), provide leadership and hope to the community on a daily basis. Less than a month after
Katrina struck, Father Henry, a former trustee of DePaul University, contacted
Reverend Dennis Holtschneider, C.M., president of DePaul, to request technical assistance from the university in the areas of urban and strategic planning,
and community development for the Tulane/Canal neighborhood.

313

St. Joseph is a central partner of many New Orleans nonprofits including
Lantern Light - a ministry of the Presentation Sisters, led by Sister Vera, that
serves the homeless in the neighborhood - and is also a founding member of
the Tulane/Canal Neighborhood Development Corporation (T/CNDC), which
has historically spearheaded affordable housing, economic development, and
social service initiatives throughout the surrounding community. But Hurricane
Katrina had exacerbated existing challenges for St. Joseph and the T/CNDC, requiring a more comprehensive planning and development initiative.
The DePaul SPS /Chaddick team was particularly well-suited to complete
this work, based on their knowledge and experience with nonprofit and public organizations and their ability to create collaborative partnerships. After
meeting with the university's executive leadership, SPS faculty proposed to assemble and dispatch a team of students to the New Orleans area to provide the
requested assistance. As a part of Vincentian-led DePaul, SPS is firmly rooted
in a service-learning ethic, and this project served to further instill these values
in participating students in accordance with SPS's stated mission:
We educate women and men to become effective public service leaders in the global community guided by the values of
St. Vincent de Paul.. . .'
And these Vincentian values are the foundation for carrying out the
broader university mission:
In meeting its public service responsibility, the university
encourages faculty, staff, and students to apply specialized
expertise in ways that contribute to the societal, economic,
cultural, and ethical quality of life in the metropolitan area
and beyond. When appropriate, DePaul develops service
partnerships with other institutions and agencies.5
The SPS / Chaddick faculty, staff, and students who have traveled to New
Orleans on this mission followed Saint Vincent's example to serve urgent human needs and recognize the God-given dignity of each person.
Following the initial trip in December of 2005, the SPS/Chaddick team
prepared a strategic plan that identified a number of other services that parishioners of St. Joseph and residents of the neighborhood needed
especially
'

School of Public Service at DePaul University, Strategic Plan 2004-05, at http:/ /www.publicservice.depaul.edu/mps/about/MPS_Strategic_P1an0405.pdf.
DePaul University Mission Statement (November 1991), at http://www.depaul.edu/
about/mission! index. asp.
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those which would help to serve and advocate for the poor. Father Henry and
SPS faculty and students presented this plan to other neighborhood groups
and used it as the basis for establishing the Mid-City Collaborative, expanding the geographic area it would serve. Since the plan's adoption in March of
2006, the Mid-City Collaborative provided the impetus for the Rebuild Center,
a community center built on the grounds of St. Joseph Church, dedicated in
August of 2007 on the second anniversary of Katrina. Numerous trips have
been made by SPS students and faculty since December of 2005 to evaluate
and make recommendations to improve the services provided at the Rebuild
Center and to write a new strategic plan for the Rebuild Center itself.
Definitions and Correlates of Poverty
Knowing the degree to which poverty existed in the Tulane/Canal neighborhood even before Katrina allows a greater understanding of the forces
that residents were up against and the kind of assistance they needed. The
formal definition of poverty in the U.S. is based on income and the degree to
which individuals and families fall at or below the poverty income threshold. For 2007, the poverty guidelines as defined by the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services are as follows:
Table 1. 2007 HHS Poverty Guidelines.6
Persons
in family or
household

48 contiguous
states and D.C.

Alaska

Hawaii

1

$101 210
131 690
171 170
201 650
24,130
271 610
311 090
341 570

$121 770
171 120
21,470
25,820
301 170
341 520
38,870
431 220

$111 750
151 750
19,750
23,750
271 750
311 750
35 1750
39,750

31 480

41 350

41 000

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
For each
additional
person, add:
6

Federal Register, Vol. 72, No. 15 (24 January 2007), 3147-3148.
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As this table shows, the poverty threshold for one person in forty-eight
states (including Louisiana) is $10,218 annually - but as already indicated,
the household income in Tulane/Canal prior to Katrina was only $6,875.
This figure is well below the threshold for one person and less than 50 percent of the guideline amount ($13,690) for a two-person household. In fact,
many neighborhoods in New Orleans were staggeringly impoverished before the storm, as shown in Figure A, prepared by the Greater New Orleans
Community Data Center (GNOCDC) in 2004, prior to Katrina.
Figure A. Percentage of people living on income below twice the poverty threshold,
by census block in Orleans Parish.
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Other Poverty Factors
While many accept these income levels as the primary criteria for defining poverty in the U.S., others claim that U.S. poverty does not really exist in
comparison to other (poorer) nations, while still others argue that the threshold of poverty is actually set too low and should be based on other factors
besides income levels. They also believe that the gap between higher and
lower incomes in the U.S. is increasing, and that families of all backgrounds
and income levels are falling farther and farther behind financially.
Seeing the Poor as Individuals
Jason Johnson suggests that the ability to identify poverty conditions and
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provide the full range of services needed by the poor comes from telling and
listening to individual stories from people of all racial, ethnic, religious, and
demographic backgrounds.7 Johnson suggests that policymakers and donors
must realize that the poor are not just out-of-work welfare mothers but also
parents who work hard, commute long distances to their jobs, and need day
care - or who work split shifts to avoid having to pay for day care. Still they
do not make enough money to obtain decent housing, adequate health care,
or a good education for themselves and their children. Thus, although they
work and may earn income above poverty guidelines, they are still poor.
These authors also provide evidence that race, gender, age, and education all play a role in determining how much income an individual or family
earns, and thus further determine whether that individual or family can be
identified as poor. But studies also show the extent to which those most likely
to be poor actually receive goods and services that help them to improve their
quality of life, such as improved housing, health care, and physical safety, and
including survival in emergency circumstances. Daugherty, like Johnson, sees
the value of providing personalized stories of individuals living in poverty as
such stories make these people more real, and more likely to elicit a measure of response from private citizens and nonprofit and public organizations.
Responses to the depth and breadth of these poverty conditions, especially
in New Orleans after Katrina, needed to provide coordinated assistance from
many sectors. This is where and how the response from SPS began.
Data
The first SPS /Chaddick Team spent eight days in New Orleans in
December of 2005. Subsequent trips were made by SPS faculty and students
in February, March, June, and December of 2006, September, October and
November of 2007 and April, September and October of 2008. The initial field
trip centered on broad input and inclusion of stakeholders, a comprehensive
needs assessment, and exploration of collaborative relationships. Researchers
spent time surveying the affected areas in the Tulane/Canal neighborhood
and documenting areas of particular concern. The rest of their time was spent
meeting with stakeholder groups and collecting data from their members.
Secondary quantitative data provided a demographic context for understanding the needs of Tulane / Canal residents and a comparison between the
Tulane/Canal neighborhood and the city of New Orleans as a whole at the
time of the 2000 U.S. Census.
Table 2 shows the central census tract of the Tulane / Canal neighborhood
Jason Johnson, "Numbers Don't Tell a Story That Connects With Readers," in What Katrina
Revealed, Nieman Reports (Spring 2006), at http://www.nieman.harvard.edu/reports/06-1NRspring/NR06-01_Katrina_eMprint.pdf.
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(Census Tract 60, U.S. Census Bureau 2000) as a subsection of Orleans parish.
Census Tract 60 compares to Orleans parish in terms of higher poverty rates
(54 percent of individuals and 45.8 percent of families with median income
at $5,904 per capita and $6,875 per household), lower median age (25.8), and
a higher proportion of females (60.8 percent). Although the neighborhood
has a larger proportion of white residents (32.5 percent) than the parish as
a whole (28.1 percent), it is still predominantly non-white (67.5% percent).
Homeownership rates (11.8 percent) and median housing values ($44,500,
51 percent of the average home value for Orleans parish) are well below that
of other parish residents. Clearly the neighborhood already had significant
initial challenges and poverty indicators prior to Hurricane Katrina.
Table 2.

Geographic
Designation

New Orleans

Tulane/Canal
(Census Tract 60)

Orleans Parish

Population size

11326

484,674

Median age

25.8

33.1

% Male

39.20%

46.90%

% Female

60.80%

53.10%

% Caucasian

32.50%

28.10%

% African-American

50.80%

67.30%

% Hispanic or Latino

1.20%

3.10%

Race
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Income and Poverty
Median household

$6,875

$27,133

Median family

$17,014

$32,338

Median per capita

$5,904

$17,258

% Families in poverty

45.80%

23.70%

% Individuals in
poverty

54.00%

27.90%

% Owner occupied

11.80%

46.50%

% Renter occupied

88.30%

42.70%

Median housing value

$44,500

$87,300

Housing

Primary qualitative data was collected by the SPS/Chaddick team after consultation with Father Perry and Sister Vera, who worked with the research team before their arrival in New Orleans to identify the primary issues
that they believed needed to be addressed in the recovery of Tulane /Canal.
These issues were initially identified as housing, health care, and economic
development - further evidence that problems associated with this degree
of poverty are multidimensional. The research team then compiled a list of
organizations present in New Orleans prior to Katrina that provided services
to address these problems. The original team identified 205 government and
nonprofit organizations. Of these 205, they targeted sixty-eight that they believed were related to the mission of the T/CNDC - thirty that dealt with
housing, twenty-three involved with health and human services, and fifteen
related to economic development. Team members were able to meet with
representatives and attend meetings in thirty-nine of these sixty-eight targeted organizations during their time on the ground in New Orleans. Data came
from participant observations of the Bring Back New Orleans Commission
(BBNOC), as well as various nonprofit organizations, public and nonprofit
collaboratives, focus groups, individual interviews with government officials, and representatives of nonprofit agencies.
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The Strategic Plan: Evidence of a Variety of Needs
As a result of this data collection the SPS/Chaddick team identified eight
major areas of need in the Tulane/Canal or Mid-City neighborhood. This basically corroborated the categories identified by Father Perry and Sister Vera,
except that the researchers focused more on housing, health, and human
services and less on economic development because they determined these
were greater needs. They specified these needs in the goals and objectives
of the Strategic Plan, initially prepared for St. Joseph Church but ultimately
adopted for the newly formed Mid-City Collaborative. The first three goals
are organizational, the next three call for the provision of services to the community's poor, and the last two are administrative. Broadly these goals are:
• Organization: clarify organizational identity and affiliations.
• Staffing and volunteers: recruit, retain, and build number and capacity
of paid staff and volunteers.
• Networking/ partnerships: maximize potential networking and
partnership opportunities with public (government), nonprofit, and
private-sector organizations.
• Housing: support for community members in all degrees of
housing need, including homelessness, affordable rental housing
and homeownership.
• Community health services and referrals for physical and mental
health needs.
• Community social services referrals and the establishment of a onestop advocacy center to provide residents and / or homeless with
appropriate services or referrals.
• Professional reports, documents and services: identify and clarify
needs for consultant and other professional services, and appropriate
experts to provide them.
• Physical and social inventory: determine the need for a detailed landuse and social-data framework for the neighborhood to advance the
position of the Mid-City Collaborative in the broader community.
The goals of the strategic plan confirm that the correlates of poverty
found in the literature and discussed in this paper indeed existed in Tulane/
Canal and Mid-City both before and after Katrina. The data also indicate
that these needs must all be addressed simultaneously if poverty is to be alleviated so that the neighborhood can move forward in the long term.
The Rebuild Center has been established to meet many of the goals of
the Mid-City Collaborative's Strategic Plan, especially in regard to providing services to the poor. Although at this writing the center has only been in
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operation for one year, its principals share a strong sense that it will help alleviate the negative effects of Katrina and poverty in New Orleans, not only
in the short term but in the long term as well. Although many organizational
partners have taken on the responsibility of actually delivering needed serv
ices, the role of the SPS/Chaddick teams in identifying these needs and proposing remedies was a major building block to serving the poor of Tulane I
Canal and Mid-City New Orleans. While much is yet to be done, the SPS/
Chaddick teams will remain involved with the evaluation of these services,
revisions to their strategic plan, and their effects on the poor of Tulane I Canal
and Mid-City.

Rebuild Center mural overlooking New Orleans.
Photo courtesy of the author

Most importantly, the Vincentian values on which the Rebuild Center
was founded are sure to play a major role in its success. For as the plan
was formulated with attention to "the societal, economic, cultural and ethical
quality of life" of the Mid-City neighborhood in New Orleans, the plan also
specifies that each individual served through the center be recognized for his
or her inherent value, and treated with dignity and respect.

